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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
STUART FOSTER HOUGHTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010020-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEiMENT 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of one count of criminal nonsupport, a third 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §76-7-201 (1999). This Court has 
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1) Should this Court review defendant's unpreserved claim that instructions 7 and 
11 misstated the law where he does not assert, let alone demonstrate manifest injustice? 
Standard of review, "Jury instruction to which a party failed to object at trial will 
not be reviewed absent a showing of manifest injustice." State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 
354 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) 
2) Did jury instructions 7, 10, and 11 comment on the evidence, overemphasize a 
parent's duty to provide support, or confuse the jury? 
Standard of review. "Because jury instructions are statements of the law, '[this 
Court will] review challenges to jury instructions under a 'correctness' standard.'" Green 
v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, f 14, 29 P.3d 638 (quoting Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 
(Utah 1998)). 
3) Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction where he 
admitted he could perform valuable labor, but continued to work only for room and board 
and had not paid any child support in over seven years? 
Standard of review. This Court "will overturn a conviction for insufficient 
evidence when its is apparent that there is not sufficient competent evidence as to each 
element of the crime charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant committed the crime." State v. Tueller, 2001 Utah Ct. App. 317, ^ 7 
(quoting State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 20, H 13, 25 P.3d 985). 
4) Should this Court review defendant's unpreserved constitutional challenge to 
the criminal nonsupport statute when defendant asserts neither plain error or exceptional 
circumstances? 
Standard of review. A defendant must demonstrate plain error or exceptional 
circumstances before an appellate court can review an unpreserved issue. State v. Tueller, 
2001 UtahCt. App. 317, f 9. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statute and rule are contained in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (1999); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of criminal nonsupport, a third degree 
felony. R. 3-5. A jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 104. The district court 
sentenced defendant to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison with credit for time 
served R. 112-13. Defendant timely appealed. R. 115. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Defendant's educational and vocational background 
After graduating from high school in 1966, defendant attended Southern Oregon 
College for one year before serving three years in the U.S. Army as a medic. State's 
Exhibit 3. : Upon being honorably discharged from the Army, defendant studied two 
more years at Southern Oregon College and also worked as a respiratory therapist at 
Rogue Valley Memorial Hospital. Id. Defendant then attended the Oregon Technical 
Institute where he studied to become a welder. Id. There, he completed an arduous 
program from which only seven of the original thirty-five students graduated. State's 
Exhibit 2. Upon graduation, defendant worked at several welding jobs. State's Exhibit 3. 
At one job he supervised up to twenty-two men who were constructing equipment for the. 
1
 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are recited in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. See State v. Tueller, 2001 Utah Ct. App. 317, ^ fl[ 2, 7 (viewing the facts in 
the light most favorable to the jury verdict when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence). 
2
 State's Exhibit 3 is contained in an envelope with the other trial exhibits. The 
exhibit envelope is indexed as part of the record on appeal, but was not given a separate 
page number. See Record Index at 2. Therefore, when refemng to trial exhibits the State 
will refer to the exhibit number, rather than a record number. 
3 
Lane County Oregon solid waste recovery facility. State's Exhibit 2. Defendant also 
worked at least two years as a self-employed welding and residential restoration 
contractor. State's Exhibit 3. In addition to his welding experience, defendant gained 
experience as a draftsman, designer, shop foreman, and field supervisor. State's Exhibit 
2. Defendant also had experience in all facets of blueprint reading and layout. State's 
Exhibits 2 & 3. 
Defendant's marriage and child support obligation 
Defendant married Nancy Parks in 1982. R. 141: 58. The two had one child 
together, a daughter named Hillary, born in 1984. Id. Defendant worked as a welder 
dunng the couple's marriage. R. 141: 70. Defendant was a heavy smoker who drank a 
"couple of quarts of beer" every night after work, and more on the weekends. R. 141: 75. 
Defendant did not experience any physical problems other than some shaking in 
his hands during his marriage to Mrs. Parks. R. 141: 73. Mrs. Parks observed that 
defendant's shakey hands correlated with his drinking and nervousness. R. 141: 73-74. 
There were times when defendant's hands would not shake at all. Id. Mrs. Parks was 
never aware of a time that defendant's shakey hands affected his employability. R. 141: 
82. 
The couple divorced in 1986. Id. The Oregon divorce decree required defendant 
to pay S200.00 per month for Hillary's support. R. 141: 58-59; State's Exhibit 1. 
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Defendant's failure to par child support 
Mrs. Parks remained in Oregon after the divorce, but soon moved to Utah. R. 141: 
76. Defendant's child support payments were somewhat regular at first. R. 141: 76-77. 
The payments became sporadic, however, from September 1987 to December 1992.3 R. 
141: 96-99, State's Exhibit 5. Two of the payments during this time included intercepted 
tax refunds. R. 141: 97. By the end of 1992 defendant had accrued an arrearage of 
S6,697.90. State's Exhibit 5. 
In April of 1992 an Oregon court found defendant in contempt and placed him on 
probation for one year. R. 141: 101. As part of his probation, defendant was required to 
submit to an alcohol evaluation, successfully complete any recommended treatment, hold 
gainful employment, and sell any vehicle he was not using. R. 141: 101-02. During 
defendant's probation, April 1992 to April 1993, he made payments every month except 
for one. R. 141: 102, State's Exhibit 5. The only payment received after defendant's 
probationary period, however, was an intercepted tax refiind in June 1993. R. 141: 93, 
102, State's Exhibit 5. 
The charged nonsupport period 
During the entire nonsupport period charged in the information, 1 January 1993 to 
24 March 2000, defendant made only four support payments, three of which occurred 
during the time he was on probation in Oregon. State's Exhibit 4. Mrs. Parks received 
3
 The State of Utah began tracking defendant's support payments in September 
1987. R. 141:94. 
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S125.00 m January, S58.00 in February, and S200.00 m April, 1993. Id All of these 
payments were received through the State of Oregon and may have been voluntary 
payments by defendant or wage withholdings. R. 141: 93. Additionally, in June 1993 the 
State of Utah intercepted defendant's S844.70 tax refund and applied it to his child 
support obligation. Id., State's Exhibit 4. 
Sometime in 1994, Mrs. Parks called defendant to encourage him to contact 
Hillary. R. 141: 67-68. After the two had discussed the possibility of Hillary's flying to 
Oregon to visit defendant, Mrs. Parks brought up the issue of child support. R. 141: 69. 
Defendant responded, "[y]ou put me in jail and you're never going to get another penny 
from me, you f-ing C-U-N-T." Id. The record does not indicate whether Hillary ever 
traveled to visit defendant. 
Defendant did not make another child support payment, voluntarily or 
involuntarily, from June 1993 until the time of trial. R. 141: 63, 93, State's Exhibit 4. 
Defendant also failed to provide any non-monetary support for Hillary. R. 141: 64. 
Sometime in 1993 or 1994, however, defendant did send Hillary S50.00 as a birthday 
present, but only after Mrs. Parks contacted him about Hillary's birthday. Id. 
At trial, defendant testified that he tried to pay as much child support as he could. 
R. 141: 114. He claimed, "I have in mind keeping up with it but at times I just didn't 
have enough to make the full payment but I tried to pay something." Id. However, his 
payment history indicated that in the more than seven-year period charged in the 
6 
information, defendant made only four child support payments totaling S1,227.70. R. 
141: 94, State's Exhibit 4. His arrearage for the charged period totaled SI6,172.30. Id. 
Defendant's evidence 
Defendant was employed as a welder for Snappy Welding Service during his 
marriage to Mrs. Parks. R. 141: 106. The welding business was sold to a new owner near 
the time of defendant's divorce. R. 141: 108. Defendant agreed to stay on with the new 
owner for one year to train the new owner in certain welding techniques. Id. Defendant 
then worked as a millwright for various construction companies installing sawmill 
equipment. R. 141:109-10. He then sought employment as a welder and found random 
part-time welding jobs while continuing to look for full-time work. R. 141: 112-13. 
Defendant claimed that in the fall of 1994 he was homeless and had developed 
health problems including a hernia, hemorrhoids, cataracts, and a neck injury. R. 141: 
115. He also had an old foot injury that gave him problems, although it had not prevented 
him from working prior to and during his marriage to Mrs. Parks. R. 141: 115, 131. He 
also claimed that the shaking in his hands started to get progressively worse. Id. The 
shaking had not previously prevented him from getting work, although it had limited the 
work he was capable of doing. Id. After he turned forty, however, defendant claimed the 
shaking became more severe, especially when he was in a stressful situation, or after he 
had performed strenuous physical activity. R. 141: 116. 
In the fall of 1994 defendant moved into what he described as a "domiciliary" at a 
Veteran's Administration ("VA") hospital and stayed for approximately eight or nine 
7 
months. R. 141: 116-17. There, he received medical treatment for his health problems. 
R. 141: 117. He also received a neurological consultation regarding his shakey hands. R. 
141:117-18. The shaking was diagnosed as benign. Id. Defendant was also given 
medication for the shaking, but he claimed it did not help. R. 141: 118-19. He stopped 
taking the medication after nine months because he claimed it made him feel 
"uncomfortable:' R. 141: 119. 
After leaving the domiciliary, defendant went to work on a friend's ranch where he 
did "everything," including roping, branding, welding, maintaining electrical and water 
service, and fixing the washing machine. R. 141: 119-20. Defendant claimed that he 
only received room and board in exchange for his work. R. 141: 120. Defendant left to 
work on another ranch, where he helped put in an alfalfa crop, again simply receiving 
room and board in return. R. 141: 121. 
Sometime in 1997 or 1998, defendant traveled to Canada to develop an abandoned 
cannery town into a hunting and fishing lodge. R. 141: 121-22, 135-36. His work 
included sketching some preliminary designs for a system to transfer water from a lake to 
some turbines, renovating old hotel rooms, and painting. R. 141: 135-36. He again 
received only room and board. R. 141: 122. 
Later in 1997 defendant began working for Willy Roof Cleaning performing 
equipment maintenance and serving as night watchman. R. 141: 122-23. The owner 
allowed him to live in a storage trailer and provided food money. R. 141: 123. 
Defendant worked at the roof cleaning business for approximately two years. Id. He left 
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because he believed he was doing valuable work and was not being fairly compensated. 
R. 141: 141. 
Defendant then went to work for First Class Corvette, where he cleaned up the 
warehouse and remodeled some of rooms above the warehouse into apartments. R. 141: 
123-24, 142. He also filled in for the shop employees whose jobs were to "detail" 
automobiles. R. 141:142, 147. Defendant would vacuum the cars and wash the windows. 
R. 141: 142. Again, defendant claimed he received only room and board, even though he 
believed his work was "advantageous to the business." R. 141: 149. Indeed, defendant 
admitted that "[he] was one of the reasons that [the business] stayed above ground." Id. 
Defendant also admitted that during the time he was working for room and board, 
he sometimes had enough money to allow him to smoke up to a pack of cigarettes a day 
and to drink a quart or even as much as a six-pack of beer each day. R. 141: 144-46. He 
claimed, however, that he would only purchase beer if he had enough money left over 
after buying food, cigarettes, and a newspaper. R. 141: 145. 
Defendant explained that he had not worked at a job that paid him a salary or 
wages after leaving the VA hospital because he "didn't feel really employable." R. 141: 
124. Defendant testified that he had applied for welding jobs, but people wouldn't hire 
him because of his shakey hands. R. 141: 125. Eventually he stopped looking for work 
because he "got tired of applying" and "got tired of hearing no." R. 141: 125, 150. He 
had never applied for work at a fast-food place. R. 141: 150. When asked by his counsel 
9 
whether he had continued to seek other employment, defendant replied, hTve never 
turned down work." R. 141: 125. 
In 1997 an Oregon Court again found defendant in contempt for willful failure to 
pay child support and ordered him to apply for Social Security disability benefits. R. 141: 
125-26, 136-38, State's Exhibit 6. His application was denied and he did not appeal. R. 
141: 126, 140. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. The Court should decline to review defendant's unpreserved claim that 
instructions 7 and 11 misstated the law because defendant does not demonstrate or even 
claim manifest injustice on appeal. Even if the Court were to review the claims, no 
manifest injustice occurred because the instructions were correct. When read together 
with instructions 5 and 6, instruction 7 correctly stated that partial support payments could 
not serve as a defense to a nonsupport charge if those partial payments were insufficient 
to relieve a child's needy circumstances. Instruction 11 also correctly informed the jury 
that one of the ways a parent could make reasonable efforts to support his child is to 
diligently seek and maintain employment. Thus, the instructions were correct. Even if 
there were some error in these instructions, however, it was neither obvious nor harmful. 
Point II. Instructions 7 and 11 did not comment on the evidence because both 
instructions were correct and impartial statements of the law. Even if some comment on 
the evidence could be inferred, any error was rendered harmless by instructions 1 and 12, 
which informed the jury that they were the exclusive judges of the facts. 
10 
Instructions 7, 10, and 11 did not overemphasize a parent's duty to pro\ ide support 
because the instructions as a whole were not weighted in favor of the State. Any 
emphasis on a parent's duty was counterbalanced by an emphasis on the defense of "just 
cause" for failing to provide. Even if there was some error in giving each of the 
instructions, it was rendered harmless by instruction 13, which directed the jurors not to 
single out a specific point, but to consider the instructions as a whole. 
Instructions 7 and 11 did not confuse the jury because they correctly explained 
what might constitute "just cause" for failing to provide support. Thus, instructions 7 and 
11 complemented, rather than contradicted, the elements instructions. 
Point III. The evidence amply supported the jury verdict. Defendant admitted 
that he could perform valuable labor despite his health problems. Nevertheless, defendant 
chose to pursue jobs that only provided him with room and board. Thus, a reasonable 
juror could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was voluntarily 
underemployed and therefore his failure to provide support was without "just cause." 
Point IV. Finally, the Court should decline to review defendant's unpreserved 
constitutional challenges to the statute because he does not assert plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appeal. In any event, the statute is constitutional because it 
never shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant. 
11 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REVIEW 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT INSTRUCTIONS 7 AND 11 
MISSTATED THE LAW BECAUSE IT IS UNPRESERVED 
AND DEFENDANT DOES NOT ASSERT MANIFEST 
INJUSTICE; IN ANY EVENT, THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE 
CORRECT. 
Defendant claims that instructions 7 and 11 misstated the law. Br. of Aplt. at 12-
19. His claim fails, however, because it is unpreserved and defendant does not discuss, 
let alone demonstrate, manifest injustice. 
Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that to preserve an issue 
involving a jury instruction, a part must make an objection "stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the ground of his objection." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) (emphasis 
added). Defendant did not object to instructions 7 and 11 as incorrect statements of the 
law. R. 141: 186-87. Rather, defendant objected to instructions 7, 10, and 11 on two 
other grounds: first, that they "amounted] not to statements] of the law but rather [to] 
commentfs] on the evidence"; and second, that "they are not warranted because there are 
instructions that provide both the element and the legal requirements of the defense of 
being unable to provide support." Id. Because defendant did not assert below that 
instructions 7 and 11 misstated the law, his claim is unpreserved. See State v. Rudolph, 
970 P.2d 1221, 1227 (Utah 1998) (finding that defendant's claim was unpreserved where 
his objection to the instructions below differed from the argument he asserted on appeal). 
A narrow exception to this general rule of preservation allows for review of 
unpreserved challenges to jury instructions under a manifest injustice standard. See id. 
12 
"Manifest injustice requires that the error be ^obvious* and 'be of sufficient magnitude 
that it affects the substantial rights of a party.'* State v. Casew 2001 Utah Ct. App. 205. «I 
26, 29 P.3d 25 (quoting Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1226). This exception should not apply to 
defendant's unpreserved claim, however, because defendant fails to assert manifest 
injustice or discuss how instructions 7 and 11 satisfy its requirements. Br. of Aplt. at 16-
19. Rather, defendant treats the issue as if it was properly preserved and asserts that this 
Court should presume prejudice. Id. Accordingly, this Court should reject defendant's 
claims without making any findings regarding manifest injustice. See Casey, 2001 Utah 
Ct. App. 205, f 26 (rejecting, without analysis, defendant's unpreserved jury instruction 
claim where defendant did not argue manifest injustice on appeal); State v. Becker, 803 
P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (same). 
A. No manifest injustice occurred with respect to instruction 7 
because the instructions as a whole correctly stated the law; but 
even assuming some error, it was neither obvious nor harmful. 
Even if this Court were to review defendant's unpreserved claim for manifest 
injustice, the claim still fails because defendant cannot demonstrate error, let alone an 
obvious and harmful error. Defendant argues that instruction 7 misstated the law because 
it "broadened the meaning of the criminal nonsupport statute to include any failure to 
provide items or advantages viewed subjectively by the child or custodial parent as 
desirable or 'adequate.'" Br. of Aplt. at 17. When read as a whole, however, the 
instructions correctly stated the law. See State v. Garcia, 2001 Utah Ct. App. 19,1] 13, 18 
13 
P.3d 1123 ("'Jury instructions must be evaluated as a whole to determine their 
adequacy."). 
No error. A person commits criminal nonsupport if they knowingly fail to support 
a minor child when that child "(a) is in needy circumstances; or (b) would be in needy 
circumstances but for support received from a source other than the defendant. . . . " 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-20 l(l)(a)&(b) (1999). Instructions 5 and 6 informed the jury of 
this element, stating that, in order to convict, the child must have been in ^needy 
circumstances, or would have been in needy circumstances but for support" from a source 
other than defendant.4 R. 80-82, Add. B (emphasis added). 
Instruction 7 then stated, "[y]ou are instructed that the offense of Criminal Non-
Support is committed not only where there is a complete failure to support the child, but 
also where there is a partial failure to provide for the children, so long as the support 
furnished is not adequate under the circumstances." R. 83, Add. B. 
Instruction 7 did not expand the statute to criminalize a failure to provide for the 
subjective wants of the child or custodial parent. After reading instructions 5 and 6, the 
jury was well aware that the statute required the minor child to be in "needy 
circumstances." R. 80-82, Add. B. Consequently, when instruction 7 informed the jury 
that partial support was not a defense "so long as the support furnished is not adequate 
4
 Instruction 5 listed the elements of third degree felony criminal nonsupport, 
while instruction 6 listed the elements of the class A misdemeanor version of the offense. 
Circumstances that elevate criminal nonsupport from a class A misdemeanor to a third 
degree felony include failing to provide support for 18 months within any 24-month 
period and accruing an arrearage in excess of $10,000.00. 
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under the circumstances," R. 83, Add. B, the jury would have understood that the 
''circumstances" to which instruction 7 referred were the "needy circumstances" 
described in both instructions 5 and 6. R. 80-83, Add. B. 
'This court will affirm when the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly tender the 
case to the jury [even where] one or more of the instructions, standing alone, are not as 
full or accurate as they might have been/' State v. Tuckett, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 295, ^  9, 
13 P.3d 1060 (quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). When 
read as a whole, the instructions correctly informed the jury that the critical inquiry was 
whether the support provided was sufficient to prevent the child from experiencing 
"needy circumstances/' but for the support of others. Accordingly, instruction 7 did not 
misstate the law. 
Obviousness. Even if instruction 7 was somehow erroneous, the error was not 
obvious, especially in light of the repeated statements in instructions 5 and 6 that the 
relevant inquiry was whether the child was in "needy circumstances." R. 80-82, Add. B. 
Indeed, any error was not obvious to defendant's counsel who failed to object to the 
instruction as misstating the law. See State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (observing that if error should have been plain to the trial court it should also have 
been plain to trial counsel, who should have raised an objection), vacated on other 
grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). 
Hamlessness. Even assuming some obvious error in instruction 7, the error was 
harmless. Defendant argues that this Court should presume prejudice because instruction 
7 inaccurately described an element of the cnme. Br. of Aplt. at 18. Instruction 7, 
however, was not an elements instruction. Rather, the elements of the cnme were entirelv 
set forth in instructions 5 and 6, to which defendant did not object below and with which 
defendant does not take issue on appeal. R. 80-83, Add. B. 
Furthermore, prejudice is presumed only when a reviewing court cannot determine 
whether the jury found all the elements of the offense. State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 
608-09 (Utah Ct App. 1998). This occurs, for example, when the tnal court fails to give 
an elements instruction, or when an elements instruction given omits an element that was 
at issue. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) (holding that complete failure 
to give an elements instruction required reversal); State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (1980) 
(presuming prejudice where elements instruction omitted mens rea element of theft by 
deception charge). 
However, where the reviewing court can determine that the jury found all the 
elements of the offense, no prejudice—and therefore no manifest injustice—has occurred; 
this is especially so where the defendant did not raise the same objection to the instruction 
the he asserts on appeal. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (1984) (finding no 
prejudice despite failure to instruct on the mens rea element where evidence conclusively 
demonstrated that defendant possessed the requisite mens rea); State v. Stevenson, 884 
P.2d 1287, 1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (finding no prejudice when the instructions 
omitted an uncontested element). Thus, even if instruction 7 could somehow be 
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construed as erroneously instructing the jury as to one element of the crime, defendant 
must still demonstrate prejudice 
Defendant cannot establish prejudice, however, because the evidence 
demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the support he provided was inadequate to 
prevent Hillary from expenencing "needy circumstances," but for the support of others 
In the seven years and three months that defendant was charged with failing to provide 
support, defendant made payments in only four of eighty-seven months, and provided a 
total of only SI,227 70 to support Hillary R. 141.94, State's Exhibit 4 $1,227 70 is not 
sufficient feed a child for seven years, let alone prevent a child from expenencing "needy 
circumstances." Moreover, the prosecutor never argued that the jury should consider the 
subjective desires of Hillary or Mrs. Parks. Instead, he focused the jury on whether 
Hillary would have been in "needy circumstances" without the support of persons other 
than defendant R. 141: 168. Thus, even assuming some obvious error in instruction 7, a 
correctly-instructed jury still would have found that defendant's support payments were 
inadequate to prevent his daughter from being in "needy circumstances" without the 
additional support from a source other than defendant. See UTAH CODE ANN § 76-7-
201(1) (1999). Accordingly, defendant was not prejudiced by any error in instruction 7 
and no manifest injustice occurred with respect to that instruction. See Casey, 2001 Utah 
Ct App 2051|26,29P.3d25. 
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B. No manifest injustice occurred with respect to instruction 11 
because it correctly stated the law; but even assuming some 
error, it was neither obvious nor harmful. 
As with his previous claim, even if this Court were to review defendant's 
unpreserved claim that instruction 11 misstated the law, the claim fails because defendant 
cannot demonstrate error, let alone an obvious and harmful error. Instruction 11 stated, 
"[o]ne who fails to diligently seek employment or engages in activity causing the loss of 
employment does not have a lawful excuse to a failure to provide charge." R. 87, Add. B. 
Instruction 10 stated, "a parent must make reasonable efforts to find ways to provide 
support for his or her children." R. 86, Add. B. Defendant argues that instruction 11 
misstated the law because a parent is only required to make a "reasonable" effort to 
support his children—the term used in instruction 10—rather than a "diligent" effort, the 
term used in instruction 11. Br. of Aplt. at 18-19. When read as a whole, however, the 
instructions correctly stated the law. 
No error. A parent's "reasonable" efforts to find ways to provide support for his 
child requires a "diligent" effort to seek and maintain employment. For example, the 
current version of the criminal nonsupport statute states that although an affirmative 
defense to the charge arises when the parent is unable to provide support, "[voluntary 
unemployment or underemployment. . . does not give rise to that defense." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-7-201(5)(a) (1999). Furthermore, "[t]he law of this state is that it is the duty of 
the father to support his minor children." State v. Burbidge, 196 P. 556, 558 (Utah 1921). 
This duty would exist "in any event if there were no statute upon the subject." Rockuood 
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v. Rockuood, 236 P. 457, 460 (Utah 1925). Indeed, "[i]t is well established that *e\ery 
parent has the duty to support the children he has brought into the world/ and this duty is 
inalienable/1 State v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1997) (quoting Gulley v. Gullew 
570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997)). Given the important and inalienable duty that a parent bears 
to support his children, the trial court correctly instructed the jury in instructions 10 and 
11 that one way a parent could make "reasonable efforts to find ways to provide support 
for his children," R. 86, Add. B, was to "diligently" seek and maintain employment. R. 
87, Add. B. 
Other jurisdictions have held that "reasonable" efforts to fulfill a parent's duty of 
support require "diligent" efforts to seek and maintain employment. The California Court 
of Appeals stated that "[o]ne who exercises reasonable diligence to procure employment 
and fails to secure work through no fault of his own, and who is without property or 
means with which to support his children, is not guilty of willfully omitting to supply 
them with necessary foot or clothing. People v. Caseri, 18 P.2d 389, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1933) (emphasis added). The California court continued, "a man shall honestly seek for 
employment and diligently perform his service to the best of his ability, contributing all 
that he can reasonably spare fo the maintenance of his children." Id. at 391 (emphasis 
added). Likewise, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a jury instruction in a criminal 
nonsupport case that stated, "it is not a lawful excuse if the defendant is unable to provide 
support due to personal extravagance, indifference, [or] lack of reasonable diligence in 
obtaining employment. Epp v. State, 814 P.2d 1011, 1014 n.6 (Nev. 1991). 
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Defendant cites State v. Bess, 137 P. 829 (Utah 1913), to support his claim that 
only "reasonable" as opposed to "diligent" efforts are required of parents to support their 
children. Br. of Aplt. at 18. Bess, however, does not support such a claim. 
In Bess, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a father's conviction for criminal 
nonsupport because the evidence did not show "willful dereliction on the part of the 
defendant in failing to provide for the support and maintenance of the children." Id, at 
832. When Mr. and Mrs. Bess divorced, Mrs. Bess was awarded custody of the couple's 
four girls, while Mr. Bess was awarded custody of the couple's two boys. Id. at 830. The 
evidence showed that the expenses of the defendant and the two boys 'far exceeded 
[defendant's] earnings." Id, at 832 (emphasis added). In fact, one of the boys was ill and 
required $30 in medicines and medical services. Id. at 831. 
Contrary to defendant's characterization, Bess supports a standard that requires a 
parent to "diligently" seek and maintain employment. In Bess, the Court found it 
significant that "it [was] not contended, or even suggested, that defendant. . . willfully or 
otherwise remained idle when he could have obtained employment." Id. at 832 (emphasis 
added). The Bess court excused the defendant's failure to provide adequate support only 
after it found that he had not willfully remained idle, nor had he allowed other 
circumstances to prevent him from working when he had the ability to do so. A rule that 
requires a parent to overcome any circumstance that might prevent him from working 
when he has the ability to do so, certainly suggests that a parent must make "diligent" 
efforts to seek and maintain employment to provide for his child. 
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In sum, when one^s child is in needy circumstances, it would be unreasonable not 
to make diligent efforts to seek and maintain employment. Bess does not hold otherw lse. 
137 P. at 832. Accordingly, instruction 11 did not misstate the law. 
Obviousness. Even if instruction 11 was somehow erroneous, the error was not 
obvious. "To show obviousness of the error, [defendant] must show that the law was 
clear at the time of trial." State v. Garcia, 2001 Utah Ct. App. 19, t 6, 18 P.3d 1123. 
Defendant cites no statute or case law stating that only "reasonable" as opposed to 
"diligent" efforts are required of parents to support their children. Br. of Aplt. at 18-19. 
Furthermore, as discussed above, Bess actually supports the "diligence" requirement. 137 
P. at 832. Thus, any error in instruction 11 was not obvious. 
Harmlessness. Finally, even assuming some obvious error in instruction 11, the 
error was harmless. Defendant again claims that prejudice is presumed because 
instruction 11 incorrectly stated an element of the crime. Br. of Aplt. at 19. As discussed 
above, however, instruction 11 was not an elements instruction, and even if it was, 
prejudice is presumed only when a reviewing court cannot determine whether the jury 
found all the elements of the offense. See Stringham, 957 P.2d at 608-09; see also. Point 
I, subsection A, above. Here, the evidence conclusively demonstrated that even if the law 
only required a "reasonable" effort, defendant's efforts fell short. 
Defendant possessed three years of college education, and had graduated from a 
technical institute where he learned to weld. State's Exhibits 2 & 3. He had extensive 
work experience and possessed a wide variety of skills. Id. Even after 1994, when he 
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claimed the shaking in his hands became worse, he admitted that he was still able to 
perform valuable work including equipment maintenance, plan design, remodeling, and 
painting. R. 119-20, 122-24, 135-36, 142, 147. Moreover, the shaking in his hands was 
diagnosed as benign, and defendant voluntarily stopped taking the medication that was 
supposed to control the tremors. R. 141: 117-19. 
Despite his admitted ability to perform valuable work, defendant chose to stop 
looking for work because he "got tired of applying" and "got tired of hearing no." R. 
141: 125, 150. He had not even attempted to apply for fast-food work. R. 141: 150. 
When his counsel asked him whether he had sought other employment besides the jobs 
that provided him with only room and board, defendant could only reply, "I've never 
turned down work." R. 141: 125. Thus, defendant "willfully or otherwise remained idle 
when he could have obtained employment." Bess, 137 P. at 832. Accordingly, even 
assuming that it was an obvious error to instruct the jury regarding "diligent," rather than 
"reasonable" efforts, defendant was not prejudiced because his efforts were not even 
"reasonable." Thus, no manifest injustice occurred with respect to instruction 11. 
II. INSTRUCTIONS 7,10, AND 11 DID NOT COMMENT ON 
THE EVIDENCE, OVEREMPHASIZE A PARENTS DUTY 
TO SUPPORT THEIR CHILDREN, OR CONFUSE THE 
JURY. 
Defendant raises three additional challenges to the jury instructions. First, he 
contends that instructions 7 and 11 commented on the evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 19-22. 
Second, he argues that the trial court overemphasized a parent's duty to support his child 
by giving instructions 7, 10, and 11. Br. of Aplt. at 23-24. Third, defendant complains 
22 
that instructions 10 and 11 were irreconcilable with the elements instructions and 
therefore confused the jury. Br. of Aplt. at 25. Each of defendant's challenges fail, 
however, because the instructions were correct and impartial statements of law. Even if 
some error could be inferred, however, the error was cured by other instructions or was 
otherwise harmless. 
A. Instructions 7 and 11 did not comment on the evidence. 
Defendant claims that instruction 7 and 11 commented on the evidence. Br. of 
Aplt. at 19-22. Defendant's claim fails, however, because instructions 7 and 11 were 
impartial and correct statements of the law.5 
"[A] court may not comment on the weight of the evidence presented at trial or 
comment on the merits of the case in such a way that indicates a preference toward either 
party." State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 980 (Utah 1998). Nevertheless, "[a] trial judge 
does not impermissibly comment on the evidence when . . . the instructions accurately 
state the applicable law." Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hosp. & Med. Or., 864 P.2d 
921, 935 (Wash. 1993) (en banc). 
Instruction 7. Defendant claims that instruction 7 "endowed the prosecution's 
case with judicial approval" because it suggested that defendant's partial support 
payments were inadequate and prevented the jury from inferring that these partial 
Defendant also asserts that instructions 7 and 11 were added, sua sponte, by the 
trial court, as if that were unusual or improper. Br. of Aplt. at 20-21, 21 n.30. While it is 
true that neither instruction appears in the proposed instructions submitted by the State or 
defendant as reflected in the record, R. 56-61, 65-73, defendant's counsel remarked that 
instructions 7, 10, and 11 were proposed by the state. R. 141: 186. 
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payments indicated he was doing his best to provide support. Br. of Aplt. at 20. 
However, instruction 7 was an impartial and correct statement of the law. It stated that 
"Criminal Non-Support is committed not only where there is a complete failure to support 
the child, but also where there is a partial failure to provide for the children, so long as the 
support furnished is not adequate under the circumstances." R. 83, Add. B. Instruction 7 
did not indicate a preference toward either party. See Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 980. Rather, it 
provided the jury with the proper legal framework for evaluating defendant's payments by 
instructing them to consider whether the payments were "adequate under the 
circumstances." Id. Because instruction 7 was correct when read in conjunction with 
instructions 5 and 6, see Point I, subsection A above, it was not a comment on the 
evidence. See Adcox, 864 P.2d at 935. 
Even if some comment on the evidence could be inferred from instruction 7, 
instructions 1 and 12 cured the error. See State v. Shepherd, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 305, ^ 
23, 989 P.2d 503 ("Even if we find error in the jury instruction, 'we will not reverse [a] 
defendant's conviction unless that error is harmful.'") (quoting State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 
988, 990 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Instruction 1 informed the jury that "it [was their] 
exclusive provence [sic] to determine the facts in the case and to consider and weigh the 
evidence for that purpose." R. 76, Add. B. Instruction 12 stated that "[i]f during the trial 
the court has said or done anything which has suggested to you that it is inclined to favor 
the claims or position of either party, you will not permit yourselves to be influenced by 
any such suggestion." R. 88, Add. B. The instruction continued, *'[t]he court has not 
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intended to indicate any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief nor 
which party should prevail. If any expression has seemed to indicate an opinion relating 
to any of these matters, you should disregard it, because you are the exclusive judges of 
the facts." Id. These instructions remedied any error arising from any comment on the 
evidence that could be inferred from instruction 7. See State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, *I 8, 
4 P.3d 778 (holding that jury instruction informing the jurors that they were the exclusive 
judges of the facts cured any prejudice arising from the trial court's comment on the 
evidence). 
For example, in Parker, the defendant was on trial for stabbing a drug dealer with 
a five-inch knife. Id. at ff 2, 4. During jury voire dire, the trial judge entered into a 
discussion with a potential juror, who was also an airline pilot, regarding the propriety of 
carrying a certain size knife into an airplane. Id. at f 4. The trial judge then showed the 
jury the three-inch blade of his own pocket knife and remarked that "his knife was 
'probably as thick a pocket knife that a fellow really ought to carry.'" Id. The jury 
instructions, however, included "an admonition that the jury not be influenced by any 
statement which they may have interpreted as indicating the trial court's views on the 
evidence." Id. at f 8. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that "any improper impressions 
created by the trial judge's comments were remedied by the jury instructions" and 
defendant was not prejudiced. Id. Thus, as in Parker, any improper impressions that the 
jury may have inferred from instruction 7 were remedied by instructions 1 and 12, which 
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directed the jury to disregard those impressions and informed them that they were the 
exclusive judges of the facts. R. 76, 88, Add. B. 
Instruction 11. Defendant claims that instruction 11 endorsed the prosecution's 
argument that defendant did not do his best to obtain paid employment, and also 
foreclosed his argument that he could not do the work for which he was trained because 
of his health problems. Br. of Aplt. at 21. However, instruction 11 correctly and 
impartially stated that "[o]ne who fails to diligently seek employment or engages in 
activity causing the loss of employment does not have a lawful excuse to a failure to 
provide charge." R. 87, Add. B. Rather than commenting on defendant's efforts to seek 
employment, instruction 11 correctly and impartially instructed the jury to evaluate 
whether defendant's efforts were sufficient to fulfill his duty to provide for his daughter. 
See Point I, subsection B, above. Because instruction 11 correctly stated the law, it was 
not a comment on the evidence. See Adcox, 864 P.2d at 935. 
In any event, even if some comment on the evidence could be inferred from 
instruction 11, the error was harmless because, as discussed above, instructions 1 and 12 
remedied any error. Additionally, any error was harmless given defendant's admission 
that he could perform valuable work despite the shaking in his hands. See the discussion 
on harmlessness in Point I, subsection B, above. 
B. Instructions 7,10, and 11 did not overemphasize a parent's duty 
to provide support. 
Because instructions 5 and 6 accurately set forth the elements of cnminal 
nonsupport, defendant claims that the trial court overemphasized a parent's duty to 
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provide support by also giving instructions 7, 10, and 11. Br. of Aplt. at 23-24. 
Defendant claims that this Court should presume prejudice because this alleged 
overemphasis somehow misinstructed the jury as to the elements of the offense. Id. at 24. 
He also argues that, even if prejudice is not presumed, the alleged overemphasis was 
prejudicial because it prevented the jury from determining that defendant had just cause in 
failing to provide support. Id. Defendant's arguments fail, however, because the 
instructions as a whole properly balanced the idea of a parent's duty to provide support 
with the defense of an inability to provide support. 
As defendant notes, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he overemphasis of 
a point may be as misleading to a jury as the omission of a point." State v. Clayton, 646 
P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982). Nevertheless, the Court has also stated, that "the mere 
duplication of an idea in the instructions is not reversible error. It if were, very few if any 
sets of instructions could be sustained as errorless." Woodhouse v. Johnson, 436 P.2d 
442, 445 (Utah 1968), overruled on other grounds by Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 
1336 (Utah 1993). Thus, although an "instruction may be duplicative of other 
instructions . . . it Ms not prejudicial. . . unless it results in the instructions being 
weighted, as a whole, in favor of [one party].'" Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 474 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah 1980)). 
The instructions as a whole were not weighted in favor of the State. See id. Any 
emphasis in the instructions on the duty of a parent to provide for his child was 
counterbalanced by an emphasis on the defense of "just cause" for failure to provide 
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support For example, instructions 5 and 6 both instructed the jury that it could not 
convict defendant unless he "knowingly and without just cause failed to provide for the 
support of the child/' R. 80-82, Add. B (emphasis added).6 Instruction 2 also mentioned 
the "just cause" defense. R. 77, Add. B. Additionally, instruction 17 clarified the "just 
cause" defense by informing the jury that the inability to provide support during the time 
period in question served as a defense to a charge of cnminal nonsupport. R.93, Add B 
Thus, to the extent that the instructions may have emphasized a parent's duty to provide 
6
 The phrase "without just cause" no longer appears in the criminal nonsupport 
statute. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201(1) (1999). Before 1995, the statute stated that a 
person committed cnminal nonsupport if he "knowingly and without just cause fails to 
provide . . . support." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201(1) (1990 & Supp. 1994) (emphasis 
added). A 1995 amendment deleted the phrase "without just cause" from subsection 1 
and replaced it with the present subsection 5 which states that "it is an affirmative defense 
that the accused is unable to provide support." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (1999) 
amendment notes. 
Defendant contends that the trial court properly instructed the jury using the pre-
1995 version of the statute because the charged period of nonsupport began in 1993 
However, cnminal nonsupport is a continuing offense. See Osborn v Harris, 203 P 2d 
917, 921 (Utah 1949). Thus, although defendant's cnme began pnor to the 1995 
amendment, it continued thereafter. Courts "apply the law as it existed at the time of the 
cnme charged." State v Redd, 1999 UT 108, f 4 n.2, 992 P 2d 98. Therefore, because 
the cnme was also committed after the amendment, the current version of the statute 
should arguably apply. 
This Court need not decide which version of the statute should apply, however, 
because any error favored defendant. Assuming, as defendant asserts, that the pre-1995 
version of the statute applies, then the elements instructions correctly included the 
"without just cause" language. R. 80-82. If, however, the current version of the statute 
applies, then the instructions erroneously required the State to prove the additional 
element that defendant acted "without just cause." Any error in requinng the State to 
prove an additional element favored defendant. Thus, whether the onginal or the amended 
statute applies is melevant. 
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support, that emphasis was counterbalanced by an emphasis on the defense of'just 
cause." 
Even if the instructions erroneously overemphasized a parent's duty to provide 
support, that error was cured by instruction 13. Instruction 13 stated, "[i]f in these 
instructions any rule, direction, or idea has been stated in varying ways, no emphasis 
thereon is intended and none must be inferred by you." R. 89, Add. B. It continued, 
"[fjor that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual point or 
instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole 
and to regard each in the light of all the others." Id. Thus, instruction 13 rendered 
harmless any error arising from the alleged overemphasis. See Hill v. Cloward, 377 P.2d 
186, 188 (Utah 1962) (rejecting a party's claim of overemphasis by noting that the jury 
was instructed not to single out any particular idea). 
C. Instructions 10 and 11 were not inconsistent with the elements 
instructions. 
Defendant also claims that instructions 10 and 11 were confusing and inconsistent 
when read together with the elements instructions, numbers 5 and 6. Br. of Aplt. at 25. 
He claims that these instructions made it unclear whether "the criminal act was any 
unmitigated failure to pay child support, or the failure to make reasonable efforts to 
provide for a child, or the failure to make diligent efforts to provide for a child." Id. 
Defendant's argument, however, ignores the plain language of the instructions. 
The instructions were not contradictory, but complementary. Instructions 5 and 6 
set forth the basic elements of criminal nonsupport, stating that the crime occurs when a 
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"defendant knowingly and without just cause fail[s] to provide for the support of the child 
. . . [when] the child was in needy circumstances, or would have been in needy 
circumstances but for support" from a source other than defendant. R. 80-82, Add. B. 
Thus, the elements instructions clearly stated that "just cause" mitigated a failure to 
provide adequate support. Id. 
Instructions 10 and 11 then explained what might constitute "just cause." 
Instruction 10 explained that "a parent must make reasonable efforts to find ways to 
provide support for his or her children." R. 86, Add. B. Instruction 11 then explained 
that reasonable efforts included "diligently seek[ing] employment" and avoiding "activity 
causing the loss of employment." R. 87, Add. B. When read together, these instructions 
explained that a parent who was otherwise unable to provide for his children, and had not 
made diligent efforts to seek and maintain employment, did not have "just cause" for 
failing to provide support. Thus, because instructions 10 and 11 complemented and 
explained the elements instructions, no inconsistency exists, and defendant's claim fails. 
III. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION. 
Defendant also claims that "the evidence does not support [his] conviction because 
it does not show that [his] physical disabilities or his financial condition did not constitute 
just cause for his failure to pay child support." Br. of Aplt. at 26. When properly 
marshaled, however, the evidence demonstrates that defendant was able to perform 
valuable work despite the shaking in his hands. Therefore, his self-described disability 
could not excuse his failure to find work and support his daughter. 
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In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate 
court views "'the evidence an all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury/" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 
(Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). A reviewing court 
"will reverse on this ground 'only when the evidence . . . is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt. . . 
.'" State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 65, 27 P.3d 1115 (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
124 (Utah 1989)) (further quotations omitted). To challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence, defendant must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then 
demonstrate that it is insufficient. State v. Lopez, 2001 Utah Ct. App. 123 f 18, 24 P.3d 
993. 
Defendant fails to marshal the evidence. For example, defendant incorrectly states 
that he attended only one year of college, Br. of Aplt. at 29, although his resume indicates 
he spent three years at Southern Oregon College. State's Exhibit 3. Defendant also 
ignores the following evidence supporting the verdict: 
• In addition to his welding experience, he also had experience as a 
draftsman, designer, shop foreman, field supervisor, and in all facets of 
blueprint reading and layout. State's Exhibits 2 & 3. 
• Mrs. Parks observed that the shaking in defendant's hands correlated with 
his drinking. R. 141: 73-74. 
• A neurologist diagnosed the shaking in his hands as benign. R. 141: 117-
18. 
• Defendant stopped taking medication for his tremors because it made him 
feel "uncomfortable." R. 141: 119. 
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• Defendant had always been able to work even though he believed the 
shaking in his hands had worsened. For example, defendant: 
• sketched a preliminary design for a water transfer system, R. 
141: 135-36; 
• remodeled and painted old hotel and warehouse rooms, R. 
141: 123-24, 135-36, 142; 
• maintained roof cleaning equipment, R. 141: 122-23; 
• worked as a night watchman, id.\ and 
• cleaned automobiles, R. 141: 142, 147. 
• Defendant believed he was capable of doing valuable work, and admitted 
that "[he] was one of the reasons that [First Class Corvette] stayed above 
ground." R. 141: 141, 149. 
When properly marshaled, the evidence demonstrates that defendant lacked 
gainful employment not because he was unable to work, but simply because he chose not 
to. Defendant was well-educated and had a wide variety of job skills and experience. 
State's Exhibits 2 & 3. Although he claimed that the shaking in his hands became worse, 
he did not apply for social security disability until he was found in contempt for failing to 
pay child support and ordered to apply for disability benefits. R. 141: 125-26, 136-38, 
State's Exhibit 6. When his disability application was denied, defendant failed to appeal. 
R. 126, 140. Sometime in 1994 he told Mrs. Parks "You put me in jail and you're never 
going to get another penny from me." R. 141:69. 
Even after the shaking in his hands supposedly worsened, defendant admitted that 
he was still able to sketch plans, remodel and paint old hotel and warehouse rooms, 
maintain equipment, and clean automobiles. R. 141: 122-24, 135-36, 142, 147. Indeed, 
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defendant admitted that he was able to perform valuable labor even though he only 
worked for room and board. R. 141: 141, 149. Moreover, despite his ability to perform 
valuable labor, defendant stopped looking for work simply because he "got tired of 
applying" and "got tired of hearing no." R. 141: 125, 150. When asked by his own 
counsel whether he had continued to seek other employment, defendant evasively replied, 
"I've never turned down work." R. 141: 125. Given this evidence, a reasonable jury 
could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's lack of gainful employment was 
not the result of a physical disability, but the result of his choice to remain voluntarily 
underemployed. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's 
conviction. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANTS 
UNPRESERVED CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS. 
Finally, for the first time on appeal, defendant argues that the current version of the 
criminal nonsupport statute violates federal and state protections of due process and equal 
protection because, without a mandated inquiry into a defendant's ability or effort to pay, 
the statute criminalizes mere poverty. Br. of Aplt. at 26 n.38. Defendant did not raise 
this objection below and does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on 
appeal. Thus, the Court should decline to consider this unpreserved issue. See State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to address issue raised for the 
first time on appeal absent contention of plain error or exceptional circumstances). 
Even if the Court were to review this issue, it is meritless because the current 
statute requires the State to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (1999). When reviewing the constitutionality of a 
statute, a reviewing court "presumes that the statute is valid," and resolves *'any 
reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, «[ 5, 31 
P.3d 547. In Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 637, 108 S. Ct. 1423, 1432 (1988), the 
United States Supreme Court held that it would be unconstitutional to require a criminal 
nonsupport defendant to carry the burden of persuasion by showing his inability to pay. 
Utah's criminal non-support statute does not violate this rule. Although an inability to 
provide support is designated as an "affirmative defense" under the current version of the 
statute, the defendant never bears the burden of persuasion. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
7-201(5)(a) (1999). It is well-established in Utah that although a defendant bears the 
burden of producing some evidence of the "affirmative defense," the burden of 
persuasion always remains on the State "to disprove the existence of affirmative defenses 
beyond a reasonable doubt." See State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992). In 
this case, instruction 17 explained this principle to the jury, stating that "[t]he law does 
not require a defendant to establish that he was unable to provide support, as the burden 
of proof is always on the State and never shifts to the defendant." R. 93, Add. B. Thus, 
the current version of the statute is not unconstitutional because it never requires the 
defendant to bear the burden of persuasion. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction for the foregoing reasons. 
Respectfully submitted this / 5 day of November, 2001. 
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Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (1995): 
76-7-201. Criminal nonsupport. 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse or children 
under the age of sixteen years, he knowingly and without just cause fails to 
provide for the support of the spouse or children when either is in needy 
circumstances. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree under the following 
circumstances: 
(a) If the actor has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, 
whether in this state or any other state; or 
(b) If the actor committed the offense while residing in another state. 
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of wedlock 
whose paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a 
civil suit. 
(5) In a prosecution under this section, it is no defense that the person to be 
supported received necessary support from a source other than the defendant. 
History: C. 1963, 76-7-201, enacted by L. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-7-201; 1974, ch. 32, § 21. Act, § 77311 et seq. 
Crow-Reference*. — Power of juvenile 
court, § 78-3a-l et seq. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (1999): 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or children under 
the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the support of the spouse, child, or 
children when any one of them: 
(a) is in needy circumstances; or 
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a source other 
than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor: 
(a) has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, whether in this state, any* 
other state, or any court of the United States; 
(b) committed the offense while residing outside of Utah; or 
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months within any 
24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of SI0,000. 
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child bom out of wedlock whose 
paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a civil suit. 
(5) (a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this section, it is an affirmative 
defense that the accused is unable to provide support. Voluntary unemployment or 
underemployment by the defendant does not give rise to that defense. 
(b) Not less than 20 days before trial the defendant shall file and serve on the 
prosecuting attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim the affirmative 
defense of inability to provide support. The notice shall specifically identify the 
factual basis for the defense and the names and addresses of the witnesses who the 
defendant proposes to examine in order to establish the defense. 
(c) Not more than ten days after receipt of the notice described in Subsection 
(5)(b), or at such other time as the court may direct, the prosecuting attorney shall 
file and serve the defendant with a notice containing the names and addresses of 
the witnesses who the state proposes to examine in order to contradict or rebut the 
defendant's claim. 
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements of Subsection (5)(b) or (5)(c) entitles 
the opposing party to a continuance to allow for preparation. If the court finds that 
a party's failure to comply is the result of bad faith, it may impose appropriate 
sanctions. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any 
party may file written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the 
request. At the same time copies of such requests shall be furnished to the other parties. 
The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish 
counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such 
instructions may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court shall endorse 
its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part refused, the court shall 
distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of the charge was given and what part 
was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless 
he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error 
may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court refers to any 
of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions 
of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has instructed the 
jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon time for argument shall be 
within the discretion of the court. 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ 
Members of the jury, it is the duty of the Court to instruct you in the law that applies 
in this case and it is your duty as jurors to follow the law as the Court states it to you, 
regardless of what you personally believe the law is or ought to be. On the other hand, it 
is your exclusive provence to determine the facts in the case and to consider and weigh 
the evidence for that purpose. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, STUART FOSTER HOUGHTON, of the 
crime of "Criminal Non-support," a Third Degree Felony, you must find that the State has 
proven each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
1. That on about or between January 1/1993, and March 24, 2000, the 
defendant, STUART FOSTER HOUGHTON, had a child who was under the age of 18; 
2. That the defendant knowingly and without just cause failed to provide for the 
support of the child; 
3. That during this time period, the child was in needy circumstances, or would 
have been in needy circumstances but for support provided from a source other than the 
defendant, or provided on the defendants behalf, and 
4. That the defendant's commission of the offense extended beyond May 3, 1999, 
and that while committing the offense beyond May 3,1999, he had a total child support 
arrearage in excess of $10,000.00. 
If you find that the evidence has failed to establish each of these elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty of the offense of "Criminal Non-
support," a Third Degree Felony. On the other hand, if you find that the evidence has 
established each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant guilty of the offense of "Criminal Non-support,H a Third Degree Felony. 
However, if, and only if, you find the defendant not guilty of the crime of "Criminal 
Non-support," a Third Degree Felony, you must decide whether the defendant is guilty of 
the lesser included crime of 'Criminal Non-support,' a Class 'A' Misdemeanor 
?* 
INSTRUCTION NO. (j? 
Before you can convict the defendant, STUART FOSTER HOUGHTON, of the 
crime of "Criminal Non-support," a Class "A" Misdemeanor, you must find that the State 
has proven each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
1. That on about or between January 1, 1993, and February 3, 2000, the 
defendant, STUART FOSTER HOUGHTON, had a child who was under the age of 18; 
2. That the defendant knowingly and without just cause failed to provide for \hp 
support of the child, and 
3. That during this time period, the child was in needy circumstances, or would 
have been in needy circumstances but for support provided from a source other than the 
defendant, or provided on defendant's behalf. 
If you find that the evidence has failed to establish each of these elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty of the offense of "Criminal Non-
support." However, if you find that the evidence has established each of these elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of the offense of "Criminal 
Non-Support," a Class UA" Misdemeanor. 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
You are instructed that the offense of Criminal Non-Support is committed not only 
where there is a complete failure to support the child, but also where there is a partial 
failure to provide for the children, so long as the support furnished is not adequate under 
the circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. A?> 
You are instructed that a parent must make reasonable efforts to find ways to 
provide support for his or her children. 
& 
INSTRUCTION NO. JNA 
One who fails to diligently seek employment or engages in activity causing the loss 
of employment does not have a lawful excuse to a failure to provide charge. 
INSTRUCTION NO, \~*~ 
If during the trial the court has said or done anything which has suggested to you 
that it is inclined to favor the claims or position of either party, you will not permit 
yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion. The court has not intended to 
indicate any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief, nor which party 
should prevail. If any expression has seemed to indicate an opinion relating to any of 
these matters, you should disregard it, because you are the exclusive judges of the facts 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 3 
If in these instructions any rule, direction, or idea has been stated in varying ways, 
no emphasis thereon is intended and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, you 
are not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction and ignore 
the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and to regard each in the 
light of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative 
importance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ ^ \ 
The Court has endeavored to give you instructions embodying all rules of law that 
may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict. The applicability of 
some of these instructions will depend upon the conclusions you reach as to what the 
facts are. As to any such instruction, the fact that it has been given must not be taken as 
indicating an opinion of the Court that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the 
facts are. If an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you find does not exisj, 
you will disregard that instruction. 
INSTRUCTION NO, )H 
It is a defense to the offense of Criminal Nonsupport that the 
accused was unable to provide support during the time period in 
question. Voluntary unemployment or underemployment by the accused 
does not give rise to that defense. 
The law does not require a defendant to establish that he was 
unable to provide support, as the burden of proof is always on the 
State and never shifts to the defendant. Rather, the law requires 
that the defendant bring forward some substantial evidence which 
tends to show that he was unable to provide support. 
